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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Taxation-Gross Estate-Inter Vivos Transfers-Retention of
Possession or Enjoyment
The federal estate tax taxes a transfer of property made by a
decedent during his life if the decedent "retained for his life . . .
or for any period which does not in fact end before his death .. .
the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property . . . ."I Several recent cases raise the question what is
meant by a retention of possession or enjoyment of the transferred
property for a period which does not in fact end before the trans-
feror's death. Is it enough that the decedent actually remained in
possession of the property until his death, or must his possession or
enjoyment have been accompanied by an agreement with the trans-
feree allowing him to do so? As far as the naked language of the
statute is concerned, it would seem that section 2036 would be satis-
fied by the continued possession or enjoyment of the decedent,
regardless of whether this was pursuant to an agreement with the
transferee. Two recent decisions hold, however, that there must
be an agreement.2
In Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States,' the decedent
in 1958 had conveyed by a recorded warranty deed his undivided
interest in the family home to his wife. He continued to live in the
home until his accidental death in 1959. The Commissioner made
a deficiency assessment, taxing the transfer of the home under section
2036 as a transfer with the retention of a life interest. The plaintiff
as executor of the decedent's estate paid the assessment and sued
for a refund. The government moved for a summary judgment
either on grounds that the facts showed there was an implied agree-
ment that the decedent might continue to live in the home, or on
grounds that his continued possession or enjoyment of the residence
until his death satisfied the statutory requirements for a tax under
section 2036. The taxpayer also moved for a summary judgment,
contending that the facts showed the absence of an express or im-
plied agreement between the decedent and his wife and that continued
factual possession and enjoyment, not based on an agreement, was
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
Stephenson v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965);
Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Tenn.
1964).
'238 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Tenn. 1964).
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not sufficient to include the value of the residence in the decedent's
gross estate. In overruling both motions for summary judgment,
the court held that the decedent's continued residence in the home
was neither sufficient to show the existence of an agreement nor to
meet the statutory requirement of retention of possession or en-
joyment. The court further held that the transfer could not be
taxed under section 2036 unless the jury determined from the facts
that there was an agreement, even an unenforceable one, giving the
decedent the right to continue living in the home. The jury found
that there was no such agreement.4 In a later case, Stephenson v.
United States,' in which the husband purchased a family home in
his wife's name and lived in the house with her until his death, the
government again moved for summary judgment because of the
decedent's factual possession or enjoyment of the home. In over-
ruling the motion, the court held that to incur tax liability under
section 2036, lifetime possession in fact must result from an agree-
ment with the transferee.
It is difficult to see any justification for interpreting section
2036 as requiring an agreement in addition to actual possession or
enjoyment of the transferred property until the transferor's death.
When the statute speaks of the decedent's retaining possession or
enjoyment "for his life" and "for any period which does not in
fact end before his death," it would appear to be contrasting reten-
tion of an interest in the property under an agreement for a life
estate with retention in fact of possession or enjoyment of the
property.0 It is, moreover, quite apparent from the Union Planters
Nat'l Bank and the Stephenson cases that actual proof of the exis-
tence or absence of an agreement for retention of possession by the
decedent of the transferred property places the government at a
severe disadvantage. This proof must be sought after the death
" Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, FED. EsT. & GIFT TAx REP.
(65-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 12,298 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 28, 1964).
'238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965). Cf. Peck v. United States, FED.
EsT. & GIFT TAx REP. (65-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 12,333 (M.D. Ga. May 5,
1965).
6 Congress apparently used the language, "for any period which does not
in fact end before his death," to cover a transfer similar to one which went
untaxed in Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927). Mrs. Coolidge had
deeded her two residences to her children on the understanding that she
would continue to live in the residences until her death, which she did. The
Court held this was not a transfer intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at her death because she had not reserved a legal interest in
the residences at the time of the transfer.
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of the transferor from interested witnesses who normally stand
in such an intimate family relationship to the decedent that their
dealings with the decedent would have been confidential.7 How
can it be determined, for example, what understanding actually
existed between the decedent and his wife about the decedent's con-
tinued occupancy of the family residence? Obviously, section 2036
was worded in broad and inclusive terms in order to prevent tax
avoidance. It would seem to encourage tax avoidance if the courts
ignore the language of section 2036 and read into the statute a
requirement of an agreement with the transferee in addition to
possession or enjoyment in fact until his death.
The only basis in the statutory language for requiring an agree-
ment that the transferor be allowed to continue in possession of the
transferred property during his life, in addition to possession in
fact of the property until his death, is the word "retained." The
statute says that the decedent must have "retained" possession or
enjoyment of the transferred property for a period not in fact end-
ing before his death. Does this necessarily imply the existence of
some agreement for the continued possession of the transferred
property, or can the requirement of retention be satisfied by posses-
sion in fact? The dictionary definition of "retain" is "to hold or
continue to hold in possession or use."8 Certainly one could keep
possession of property without any agreement for continued posses-
sion. A wrongdoer who seized property against the true owner's
will might "retain" possession of the property, even though this
retention was quite independent of any agreement with the true
owner and was in fact in complete defiance of the true owner's
wishes. It is certainly a strained interpretation of section 2036 to
say that the statute's use of the word "retained" implies a require-
ment of an agreement for continued possession. Moreover, there
seems to be little justification for straining if this defeats the policy
of the statute, as it appears to do. Presumably, Congress provided
that there should be a tax where a person transfers property and
retains possession or enjoyment of the transferred property for a
' In both cases the evidence establishing that there was not an express
or implied agreement concerned private conversations between the de-
cedent and his wife at the time of the transfer. In Stephenson, Mrs. Stephen-
son quoted her husband as saying at the time he gave her the home, "It's
yours to do with as you choose, you can even put me out if you wish."
238 F. Supp. at 662, n.2.
'WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1965).
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period not in fact ending before his death in order to prevent tax
avoidance by means of apparent outright transfers coupled with
secret agreements for retention of possession. The test which the
statute appears to lay down for a tax is the objective fact of con-
tinued possession for the actual duration of the transferor's life,
rather than his subjective state of mind or some unknown agree-
ment with a transferee."
It is difficult in these cases to discern the relevance of an un-
enforceable agreement. An enforceable agreement that the trans-
feror shall have possession of the transferred property until his
death would be tantamount to a reservation of a life estate. It is
also difficult to see how an unenforceable agreement adds anything
to retention in fact, since it has no legal status. An unenforceable
agreement might indicate an intention to retain possession of the
transferred property during the transferor's life, but, if the critical
characteristic of a taxable transfer under section 2036 is the ob-
jective operation of the transfer,"0 the subjective state of mind of
the transferor would seem to have no significance.
Prior to the Union Planters Nat'l Bank case there were decisions
hinting that some sort of agreement for continued possession or
enjoyment was necessary for a tax under section 2036,11 but there
does not seem to have been any case which squarely held that the
agreement was a sine qua non of the tax where the decedent's
possession and enjoyment had continued from the time of the trans-
fer until his death.
There have been decisions in which an agreement has been used
as a makeweight along with continued possession or enjoyment to
impose a tax liability. This was the case in Estate of McNichol v.
Commissioner'" where the decedent transferred by warranty deed all
of his income-producing property to his children and continued to
See note 10 infra.
"o Sections 2036 to 2038 which tax incomplete inter vivos transfers grew
out of and amplify the wording of section 202(B) of the Revenue Act of
1916 that taxed transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after . . ." the death of the transferor. Mr. Justice Holmes in Shukert
v. Allen, 273 U.S. 545 (1927), established an objective test for transfers
taking effect at death. In Estate of Speigel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701
(1949) rehearing denied 336 U.S. 915 (1949), the subjective intent of a
transferor was held immaterial in determining whether a transfer took
effect at death. See LOwNDEs & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES
§§ 6.1-6.3 (2d ed. 1962).
See cases cited notes 12-19 infra.12265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), affirming 29 T.C. 1179 (1958).
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receive all of the rents from the property under an oral agreement
with his children until his death. The taxpayers argued that the
transfer was not taxable because the oral agreement was unen-
forceable under the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds and, there-
fore, did not give the decedent a "right to the income." The Tax
Court 3 rejected this argument and held that the receipt of the income
was a retention of possession and enjoyment, declaring that the
statute posed alternative tests for inclusion-either the right to
income or the factual retention of possession and enjoyment, re-
gardless of the decedent's retention of any right to the property.
In affirming the Tax Court's decision, the Third Circuit' 4 placed
more reliance on the presence of the agreement, holding that retain-
ing even an unenforceable right to the income is taxable as retention
of possession and enjoyment. The court limited its decision to the
facts of the case and declined to say whether it would have upheld
the tax if there had been no evidence of an agreement. In Harter
v. United States", the decedent in 1935 had conveyed income-pro-
ducing property to his wife by a warranty deed that was not re-
corded until 1950 when he was in his final illness. Up until the
time of his death he had received all of the rents from the property,
and from 1941 to 1947 he had reported the rents as income and had
taken deductions for depreciation of improvements to the property
on his separate income tax returns. The court held the transfer
to be taxable, basing its decision on the factual retention of a life
interest and an inferred agreement between the decedent and his
wife that he would control the property. Neither of these decisions
decided directly that an agreement is indispensable for a tax under
section 2036.
In other cases, agreements have been the deciding factor in de-
termining whether the decedent was the settlor of a trust under
which he had a life interest. This was one of the issues in State
St. Trust Co. v. United States" where the decedent had originally
created a trust for his children, reserving the power to terminate
it. He terminated the trust in favor of the children upon their
agreement to use the funds to establish a second trust, the one in
issue in the case. The court found the decedent to be the settlor
"29 T.C. 1179 (1958).
'265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
1 55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 55,397 (N.D. Okla. 1954).
10263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
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of the second trust on the theory that he was the substantial creator
of the trust. The question of who is the settlor of a trust also
comes up in cases involving cross or reciprocal trusts in which
agreements have been relevant in determining whether one trust
was created as consideration for the other trust.17 Agreements were
significant in these cases in determining whether the decedent was
the transferor, not in establishing whether he had retained a taxable
life interest in the transferred property.
In cases where the decedent overtly transfers possession and
enjoyment which he later receives back from the transferee, agree-
ments have been necessary to prove that the decedent never com-
pletely divested himself of the transferred property. In Estate of
Skinner v. United States"8 the decedent created an irrevocable
trust that gave the trustees a discretionary power to pay the income
to the decedent or to others. Tax liability was imposed after it was
established that the decedent had received all of the income of the
trust during her life as a result of a prearrangement with the trustees.
In Burrill v. Shaughnessy"9 the court refused to uphold a tax when
the government failed to sustain its allegation that the decedent-
settlor had been appointed a contingent life estate in a trust as a result
of a prearrangement with the donee of the power. This, however,
was not a case of continued possession or enjoyment. The decedent
had created an irrevocable trust giving his wife the income for her
life and a limited power to appoint to him by will, which she ex-
ercised several months after he had transferred the property into
the trust.
None of the previous cases hold that an agreement for retention
of possession or enjoyment is a prerequisite for a tax under section
2036 when the decedent retained possession or enjoyment of property
he transferred during his life for a period not in fact ending with
his death. They were either cases where agreements were necessary
to determine whether the decedent was in fact the transferor of the
property, as in the State St. Trust Co. case, or cases where, in
instances of interrupted possession or enjoyment, agreements were
'" Estate of Guenzel v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 248 (8th Cir. 1958);
McLain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1956); Newberry's Estate v.
Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953).
" 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963). Cf. Estate of T. M. Flynn, 13 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1380 (1944); Estate of J. H. Scheide, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1087 (1947).
" 71 F. Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1947).
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invoked to determine whether the decedent had completely divested
himself of the property at the time of the transfer, as in the Skinner
case. There were also cases in which agreements were used as a
makeweight in finding a tax liability, as in McNichol, but no cases
squarely holding that no tax would be imposed on continued pos-
session or enjoyment in the absence of an agreement.
The Treasury contends that if the decedent transferred his home
to his wife or to his children, the full value of the home should be
included in his gross estate in any of the three following situations:
(1) if by state law he had a legally enforceable right to live in the
home as long as it belonged to his wife, or (2) if he was discharging
a legal obligation to support his wife or children, or (3) if he con-
tinued to reside in the residence until his death."
In light of the literal wording of section 2036 and the apparent
policy behind the statute to prevent tax avoidance, it is submitted
that the Treasury's position is sound and should be followed.
WILLIAm S. LOWNDES
Torts-Implied Warranty in Real Estate-Privity Requirement
The principle of caveat emptor' in real property sales is begin-
ning to show cracks in what previously was its impregnable structure.
In 1936 Professor Williston said, "There are no implied warranties
in sales of real estate."2 Although this is still the rule in a vast
majority of the jurisdictions in the United States,3 the reasoning
behind it seems to be weakening.
The first inroad into the principle involved houses to be con-
"0 Speech by Chief Counsel Sept. 19, 1964, as reported in 4 REsEARcH
INSTITUTE TAX COORDxNATOR 47008C (1965).
'The North Carolina view is that caveat emptor will be followed in
the sale of real property provided no fraud is involved. Smathers v. Gilmer,
126 N.C. 757, 759, 36 S.E. 153, 154 (1900). For a further discussion of the
North Carolina view see 42 N.C.L. Rav. 946, 951 (1964). See generally
Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty, 14 VAND. L. Rxv. 541 (1961);
Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose,
37 MINN. L. REv. 108 (1953); Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931); Comment, 5 DE PAuL L. REv. 263
(1956); Note, 4 W. REs. L. REv. 357 (1953).4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926, at 2602 (rev. ed. 1936).
'E.g., Narup v. Higgins, 51 Ill. App. 2d 102, 200 N.E.2d 922 (1964);
Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963); Shapiro
v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955); Steiber v. Palumbo,
219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959). See 55 Am. Jum. Vendor and Purchaser
§ 368 (1946); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 446 (1961).
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